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Abstract
In our contribution we study how the ownership channel affects the stock price volatility
of listed stock markets. In particular, we study how a linkage between a parent company and
its affiliates may drive differences in stock price volatility, within and across countries. We
exploit a worldwide dataset of stock-exchange listed firms, controlling for several financial
dimensions, to assess whether business groups matter to financial volatility. The answer is
positive and does not depend on the definition of volatility used. Our results contribute to
the corporate finance literature by defining the role of multinational corporate control in
financial markets, and to the financial stability literature by assessing corporate control as
an undiscovered channel of transmission for financial shocks.
Keywords: corporate control, stock price volatility, multilevel model.
Jel codes: F23, G32.
1 Introduction
One relevant question, for financial stability purposes, regards the volatility and the shock
transmission of financial markets. This is the phenomenon by which a stock market subject
to a period of high volatility can cause the same instability to spread to other markets. On
exchange-traded markets, the volatility of stock prices has been studied through many chan-
nels: none of them is related to the ownership structure of the firms issuing the shares, namely
parent and affiliate firms, or stand-alone firms. Nonetheless, as stated by Altomonte and Rungi
(2013), Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) contribute to a large portion of world-wide added
value through the establishment of hierarchies of firms. Therefore, it is credible that there is a
potential for multinationals to act as a channel for economic shocks, as intented by Desai and
Foley (2006). To the best of our knowledge, what is missing in the literature is a bridge linking
multinational companies and business groups to the share price volatility, if such a bridge does
exist. With this study, we aim to fill the gap. We find that a connection exists, affiliates have a
different behaviour on listed markets compared to their parent, and a business group behavior
is well defined also on financial markets. We infer that the existence of such a relationship on
financial markets discounts the investors credence that the business group internal strategy and
information are passed quickly through the property channel, that goes beyond the nationalities
of the companies constituting the business group.
Hierarchies of firms are groups made of a parent and its affiliates, which have a formally
autonomous legal status. Among them, a corporate control linkage is established for the joint
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management of productive activities. Both a parent and some of its affiliates may quote some
financial activities on stock exchanges. We study how such linkages may affect price volatility
across firms that are part of the same hierarchy, possibly crossing national borders. This is
particularly relevant in the case of multinational enterprises, when one or more affiliates are
located in a country different from the country of the parent company. It is reasonable to
assume that shocks occurring within a hierarchy of firms can be transmitted:
i. in the same country, across firms, when the group is domestic;
ii. across countries, across firms, when the group is multinational.
We find that corporate control matters. Affiliates reveal less volatility than their parent
companies in weekly prices of financial activities quoted on the stock exchange. Moreover, after
introducing an empirical three-level model for explaining observed variance, we find that there
is less variance at a group level than across firms and time. That is, price activities show a
narrower range of volatility when a hierarchy of firms is established. We argue that this is likely
due to information on the common fundamentals that is passed to investors when they consider
all the firms as a unique entity. In this framework, a shock occurring in one affiliate can pass to
its co-affiliates faster, within one country in case of a domestic group, and across countries, in
the case of MNEs.
Our findings are robust to different metrics of volatility and empirical methodologies. They
point to a necessity to include control linkages when evaluating the prices of financial activities
of firms belonging to the same corporate entity, albeit formally autonomous from a legal point
of view. Take the case of Unilever PLC, located in U.K., with 281 subsidiaries and six branch
locations recorded worldwide. Our dataset catches the parent company and five of its affiliates,
issuing ordinary shares. Parent shares have GBP currency, while the listed affiliates, located in
Ivory Coast, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Nepal trade with XOF, GHS, INR, NGN, NPR currencies
respectively. For each of them, as for the rest of firms of the dataset, we observe the share price
of 52 weeks. It must be noted that those prices vary across both weeks and firms: we choose
not to aggregate in any way the a priori variability stemming from the data, not to lose their
informativeness.
Figure 1: Example: the hierarchical structure of Unilever PLC
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The contribution proceeds as follows: in section 2 some related works are introduced. In
section 3 the data are described. Some descriptive statistics, the construction of the financial
covariates and the observed preliminary evidence are also provided. In section 4 the methodology
is explained. In section 5 the empirical results can be found and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Not many papers questions whether corporate control and business groups matter to financial
markets. Restricting the focus on MNEs, one is Choi and Jiang (2009) relative to the smoo-
thing role of operational hedging for the exchange risk. The authors find that MNEs, compared
to propensity-score matched non-multinational enterprises, are less exposed to exchange risk
and have higher stock returns, thanks to operational hedging. While this paper focuses on
the side of business performance and risk, Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) assess the positive role
of the firm’s multinationality on its capital structure: they find that multinational companies,
compared to domestic companies, have significantly lower debt ratios, with such debt ratios
decreasing with increasing multinationality. Keeping in mind that the static trade-off theory
predicts an optimal capital structure of the firm (the debt/equity ratio that optimizes its value)
the latter finding entails that either all MNEs have a different debt/equity target from domestic
companies, or multinationality becomes a discriminant towards the preference for a pecking
order theory rather than a static trade-off theory1: this could be indeed the case because of
an asymmetry of information while acquiring external financing, evidenced by the structure
of MNEs, between the inside and the outside group information available to investors. The
question is now if this asymmetric information evidenced by MNEs does really depend on MNEs
multinationality or if it depends just on its business structure. To this purpose, one could
ask whether affiliates’ multinationality facilitates corporate control: an evidence according to
Sturgess (2016), global diversification premium is positively related to “winner-picking” transfers
in internal capital market. For how it regards internal capital market, MNEs result to employ
internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome imperfections in external capital markets
according Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) and Desai, Foley, and Hines Jr (2005); Foley and
Manova (2015) posits that financial frictions and the use of internal capital markets shape
decisions that multinationals make regarding production locations, integration, and corporate
governance. Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) provides evidence that multinational affiliates also
access parent equity when local firms are most constrained. This is the case also for domestic
firms: Cai et al. (2016) empirical results on Chinese firms show that group affiliation decreases
cash holdings, alleviating the agency costs due to free-cash-flow problem of undertaking low
profitable investments2. A similar explanation for the use of subsidiaries and internal capital
market is that firms use nonguaranteed subsidiary debt as a mean to control the wastage of
free cash flows in their cash cows without inducing underinvestment in their growth divisions,
according to Kolasinski (2009). Summing up, this literature seems to originate the necessity for a
corporate control either from agency problems and informational asymmetry, or from financial
frictions and imperfections in capital markets. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) provides a
useful linkage between stock prices and the firm’s need of external equity: they find that stock
prices have a stronger impact on the investment of firms that need external equity to finance
marginal investments. Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) suggests that active trading enhances the
incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, and Gaˆrleanu, Panageas, and Yu
(2015) states that the market is subject to contagion: an adverse shock to investors in some
locations affects prices everywhere, because small changes in market-access costs can cause a
1. For a review on this topic, see Myers and Majluf (1984), De Haan and Hinloopen (2003), and Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1999).
2. On agency costs and the free-cash-flow problem, see Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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change in the type of equilibrium, leading to discontinuous price changes. From a macroeconomic
perspective, not only there is no strong evidence that group-level firms are better insured against
times of adverse macroeconomic shocks (see Khanna and Yafeh (2005)), but full integration of
global financial markets may be not very desirable for financial stability, as risks were spread
around the world: even if financial globalization provides a reduction in transaction costs and
boosts both trade and foreign direct investment, the price is in terms of more exposure of the
real economy to financial shocks; international linkages can propagate economic shocks and
rise the default probabilities of firms from different areas (see Stiglitz (2010), Poelhekke (2016)
and Al-Haschimi et al. (2014) respectively). Increased connectivity among firms plays a role
in financial stability: Desai and Foley (2006) claim is that “multinationals act as a channel of
economic shocks: high correlations of country-wide returns and investment within multinational
firms suggest that shocks that occur in one part of the world may be transmitted across borders
because of a multinational firm’s world-wide network of subsidiaries”. Eden (2017) shows that
financial integration amplifies shocks in relatively distorted economies; Cravino and Levchenko
(2016) assessed a non-negligible impact of foreign shocks on productivity shocks, transmitted
by all foreign multinationals combined; Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) study the mechanisms
through which output volatility (the volatility of aggregate output growth) is related to trade
openness, with sectors more open to international trade being more volatile. So, even if business
groups have been studied from both a micro and a macroeconomic perspective, there are still
some open questions such as: do markets and investor recognize that it exists a group-level
financial volatility? Are business groups trying to minimize their financial volatility using their
subsidiaries? Vice versa are increasing business groups becoming themselves sources of financial
instability, by bringing more connections into the world-wide financial system?
3 Data construction and preliminary evidence
The dataset can be broadly described as consisting of two main components: a static and a
time-dependent part. The parent-affiliates dataset includes all financial information of parent,
affiliates and stand-alone companies; it is relative to the year 2013 and retrieved from Orbis.
The 52-weeks addendum sourced from Bloomberg links the firm’s share prices to each firm with
its kit of corporate information. A parent company is a firm that owns more than 50% eq-
uity of another company, the “affiliate”, in respect to which it will become the “parent”. An
affiliate is thus a firm having at least (and exactly) one parent company. In our dataset only
listed firms are included: all non-listed affiliates of the parent companies are excluded from the
dataset. The set of all affiliate with their uniquely defined parent is what we call a business
group. A stand-alone firm is a company with no parent. The world-wide dataset that takes
into account the volatility measure consists of 43′374 firms: 26′644 parent, 2′638 affiliates and
14′092 stand-alone3 firms. The average number of affiliates per parent is 1.88, with peaks of
64 and 131 affiliates per parent at the 95% and at the 99% frequency percentile respectively.
Table 1 shows the regional distribution of firms into the dataset split by parent, affiliate, and
stand-alone firms. The most populated regions of the final dataset are the U.S.A., the E.U., and
China, followed by Asiatic and Indian regions, Japan and Canada. The number of affiliates is
relevant even though less than parent companies.
It could be the case of financial volatility being dependent on the firm structure main indi-
cators rather than the business structure of the group. We assess the dependence of volatility
from several financial variables of the firms that account for the firm’s structure, productivity,
financial leverage, and credit constraint. We construct four indicators: financial assets and fixed
3. See data appendix A for details on the data and on the financial variables constructed.
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Table 1: Geographic coverage by type of firm
Region Affiliates Parent Stand-alone Total
Africa 97 431 143 671
Asia - other 418 1’965 2’031 4’414
Canada 191 1’835 1’057 3’083
Central America 76 630 197 903
China 158 3’536 907 4’601
Europe - EU 526 5’260 1’825 7’611
Europe - Non EU 27 348 32 407
India 177 1’024 2’570 3’771
Japan 262 2’654 551 3’467
Korea 86 658 987 1’731
Middle East 232 1’083 917 2’232
Oceania 43 1’338 243 1’624
Russia 69 121 24 214
South America 146 325 139 610
USA 130 5’436 2’469 8’035
Total 2’638 26’644 14’092 43’374
The most populated regions of the final dataset are the U.S.A., the E.U., and China, followed by Asiatic and
Indian regions, Japan and Canada. The number of affiliates is relevant even though less than parent companies.
assets retrieved from the Asset side and equity/debt and long/short term debt from the Liability
side of the balance sheet. Financial assets approximates the relevance of financial activity vis
a` vis the productive activity. This ratio provides a control for financial share price volatility by
revealing the percentage of financial expenditure in financial investments over the characteristic
activity of the firm. The percentage fixed assets of total assets monitors the investment decisions
as a way to improve productivity. The inverse of the leverage ratio equity/debt is intended to
capture a premium of not recurring to external funding and at the same time it can reveal the
health status of the firm, since highly indebted or less capitalized firms are likely to be less
resilient during crisis time. The maturity composition of financial sources reflected by long term
debt over short term debt ratio provides an insight into the financing choice of the firm: e.g.,
a high amount of short term debt compared to long term debt may indicate suffering financing
needs. We consider also the indicators of labour productivity and financial pressure. The latter,
defined similarly to the borrowing ratio of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), is used to assess the
premium on borrowing costs and the probability of credit being rationed. In the post-estimation
of section 5.3, we use the Tobin’s q to assess the dependence of the estimated parameter for the
parent on its investment opportunities.
Volatility is defined as the logrange between maximum and minimum price in a fixed amount
of time; for the purposes of this article, that amount of time corresponds to a week. The measure
defines a dispersion of the price fluctuations around the traded stock price; the exact definition
of volatility is reminded to formula 4 of section 4.1. Volatility values are negative and in line
with the results of mean estimation of Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) that they obtain
via Monte Carlo simulation.
Figure 2 plots the volatility values for Unilever PLC and its affiliates and helps depicting
what we are going to assess. In blue, we can distinguish the behaviour of the parent company
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Figure 2: Volatility of Unilever PLC and its listed affiliates
The behaviour of the parent company (blue) and its affiliates (amber) over one year. The parent seems to dictate
a trend to its affiliates.
over one year. It seems clearly to represent a trend for its affiliates, even though the latter show
a more widespread volatility. If every parent company with its affiliates were like this case, the
chart would tell the following:
1. the business group listed affiliates show a group behaviour in terms of volatility, of which
the parent seems to dictate the trend;
2. the affiliates behaviour is clearly discernible from the parent one and adds variability;
3. the group structure does not decompose or disappear through the weeks, even though
some outliers.
The first item postulates the existence of a group-level decision taking able to influence in-
vestors on the stock markets. This is likely due to information on the common fundamentals
that reaches investors considering the business group as a unique entity. Also, this could reveal
unnoticed sources of systemic risk, when the property channel acts as a chain for the propa-
gation of instability on financial markets. In terms of methodology and expected results, the
observations translate into the following hypotheses:
1. a multilevel random model is preferable to OLS since there is a considerable overlap of
volatility among a business group;
2. a dummy for affiliate should be significant and with an higher dispersion compared to the
one of the parent company;
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3. the snowflake structure depicted by figure 1 is robust across the weeks, that is the standard
deviation coefficients from the multilevel regression are expected to be significant.
Figure 3: Volatility (mean and standard deviation) by type of firm
Listed affiliate firms are slightly less volatile compared to their parent.
Figure 3 displays mean values and standard deviations by type of firm4. Listed affiliate
firms are slightly less volatile compared to their parent. The expected negative premium to
volatility by the dummy affiliate is confirmed in table 2, both on the parent and affiliate dataset
only and by regressing on the whole dataset. In absolute terms, the premium further increases
once we standardize the measure of volatility and we control for cluster on the population of
firm identifiers (id). The preliminary evidence suggests that the parent and affiliates show
distinguishable volatility behaviours, even with the same common trend. This could signal a
strategy of the parent company to build a hierarchy of firms to stabilize its volatility on financial
markets, thanks e.g. to different trade currencies.
4 Methodology
The methodology applied can be easily split into two main modellings: the mathematical frame-
work for the definition of financial volatility and the econometric model for the build-up of the
results.
4.1 The measure of volatility
We use a stochastic model for financial volatility based on stock prices. Following Alizadeh,
Brandt, and Diebold (2002), we apply a first-order parametrization to a stochastic volatility
model, in which the price S of a security evolves as a diffusion process5 with both instantaneous
4. Other descriptive tables can be found in the appendix.
5. A diffusion process is a Markov process, i.e. a random process whose future probabilities are determined by
its most recent values, such that, under several regularity assumptions, is completely determined from its first
two moments. See Itoˆ (1974) for its mathematical definition.
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Table 2: Preliminary evidence, excluding and including single firms
Dependent variable:
Volatility Parent and affiliates All firms
Affiliate -0.155*** -0.189***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.023*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001)
R squared 0.002 0.002
N 1’281’413 1’841’890
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses. Standardized variables, clustered by firm.
The dummy for affiliates is significant and shows a negative premium to volatility.
drift µ and volatility σ dependent on a latent diffusion process ν with constant volatility β and
no correlation between the Wiener processes of the price and the latent variable equation:
dSt = µ(St, νt)dt+ σ(St, νt)dWSt
dνt = α(St, νt)dt+ β(St, νt)dWνt
(1)
where: 
dWStdWνt = 0
σ(St, νt) = σtSt
σt = exp(νt)
α(St, νt) = α(lnσ − lnσt)
µ(St, νt) = µSt
β(St, νt) = β.
(2)
By combining equations 1 and 2, we have that returns dS/S follow a geometric Brownian
motion:
dSt
St
= µdt+ σdWSt
dln σt = α(lnσ − lnσt)dt+ βdWνt ,
(3)
and therefore, by Itoˆ’s lemma, the log security price process st = ln St follows a Brownian
motion. Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) prove that the univariate range, defined as the
interval between the maximum and the minimum log stock price over a period, is an efficient
volatility estimator, nearly log-normal, and robust to market microstructure noise induced e.g.
by the bid-ask bounce. The latter can cause an overestimation of the measured price volatility
that is increased instead by the transactions bouncing between buy and sell6. Therefore, in case
we had chosen the realized volatility instead of a range-based estimator, the realized volatility
could have accumulated a large bias by summing up upward biased squared returns, since it is
the sum of squared returns over a given sampling period7. Thanks to the result of Alizadeh,
6. On market microstructure noise, see e.g. Bandi and Russell (2008), Bandi and Russell (2006).
7. For further estimation of stock volatility with range-based estimators, historical evolution and comparison
with other methods, see e.g. Christensen and Podolskij (2007) Jacob et al. (2008), Martens and Van Dijk (2007),
Christensen and Podolskij (2007).
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Brandt, and Diebold (2002) we build the weekly volatility proxy8 as:
volt = ln(hight − lowt), (4)
where hight and lowt represent the observed weekly high and low prices respectively of the
process of log prices st
9. Notice that this dispersion measure does not depend on the series
of opening nor closing prices, thus it is independent across weeks, since it is function of non-
overlapping increments of a Brownian motion.10
Our methodology will not proceed further by aggregating this measure across weeks. Al-
though several price-based estimators can serve well as standard deviation volatility measures
(see e.g. Martens and Van Dijk (2007)), the benefit of our approach consists in a very low ma-
thematical manipulation of the data: since we do not calculate any aggregated measure across
the weeks, we are able to translate time variability genuinely into the model. That reduces some
numerical noises, but comes at a price: the econometric model able to reflect the longitudinal-
nested dataset is one-level more complex than it would be by using an aggregate measure for
volatility across weeks, and it is described below.
4.2 The econometric model
Our strategy is to exploit Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) - based multilevel models,
that should be compared to the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. Multilevel or random-
effects models allow for the most accurate estimation of the regression parameter when there are
several layers inside a variable. Hierarchical, nested or time–dependent dataset would generally
require such an approach to avoid unpleasant fallacies that lead to estimation biases, such as
interpreting associations at the higher level as pertaining to the lower level. Instead of having
to make a decision regarding the unit of analysis, the use of multi–level modeling will avoid the
fallacies by considering all levels simoultaneously. All the cases in which we have clusters among
the data are better studied through this kind of methodology: any within–cluster dependence
violates the assumption of ordinary regression models and consequently ordinary regression pro-
duces incorrect standard errors. Furthermore, multi–level models represent the only way to
assess an intra–layer dependence. In our case the main layers are the population of firms and
the parent companies on top of them. We will adopt both the two–level in the case of volatility
measure aggregated over time and the three–level model when using our definition of volatility
whose value changes over time11.
The intuition that we want to test is whether belonging to the same business group creates a
discrimination at a group level among the population of affiliate companies. This group specific
bias will be determined by a group common pattern through, e.g., vertical integration, knowledge
sharing, internal capital markets, group management decisions. We use a three-level random
intercept model instead of a two-level model in order to keep the time variable for the reasons
exposed in the previous paragraph. The most granular level is given indeed by the time-variable
financial volatility. A middle level is represented by the whole population of firms and it is
nested into the upper level of parent companies. Therefore, our model has both a longitudinal
design between first two levels and a cross-sectional or hierarchical design between parent and
8. The equation 4 referring to observed prices is also dependent on the index i for each firm in the population;
we omit this subscript for simplicity, minding however the important dependence.
9. Both the supt=weekjst and the inft=weekjst are realized into the hight and lowt respectively, in every closed
interval represented by weeks j = 1, 2, ..52.
10. E.g., given the series of opening log prices opent, Ht = ln(
hight
opent
), Lt = ln(
lowt
opent
), ln(Ht − Lt) = ln( hightopent ∗
( opent
lowt
) = ln(hight − lowt).
11. A comprehensive review of multilevel models is provided in Gelman and Hill (2006).
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affiliates. An example scheme is given in figure 4. It fully reflects the preliminary snowflake
structure evidenced by the example in figure 1.
Figure 4: Nested and longitudinal structure of the three-level model
The three-level model in the base case takes the following form:
ytij = β1 + ς
(2)
ij + ς
(3)
j + tij . (5)
The run can estimate the financial volatility ytij among the weeks t = 1, 2, ..52 and the zero
means and mutually uncorrelated error components. In our representation:
• the random intercept ς(3)j for parent group j has variance that represents the between
groups portion of variance;
• the random intercept ς(2)ij for affiliate i and parent group j has variance that represents
the between affiliates and within groups portion of variance; and
• the residual error tij for week t, affiliate i and parent group j has variance that represents
the between weeks, within affiliates, and within groups portion of variance.
We will estimate the model (5) with several covariates xij . In the case we have only the
dummy for affiliate xi equal to 1 if the company is an affiliate company and 0 otherwise the
formula is:
ytij = β1 + β2xij + ς
(2)
ij + ς
(3)
j + tij . (6)
The estimation results by layers will tell if the three-level well captures the time varying
dependency of the volatility against the business group structure, without soiling the volatility
itself with a priori data manipulations imposed by a synthesized mathematical object. The
business group structure itself will be also recognized if we obtain significant standard devia-
tions at firm and group levels. In this case corporate control will translate into a well-defined
hierarchical object able to play a role for the price volatility propagation.
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4.3 The design of the robustness checks
We perform the robustness checks with the most common aggregated measures for standard
deviation of the log prices over the weeks12. The rationale is that we do not want to choose
a specific measure to test against our model. Since no measure has been classified as the best
one by the literature, we make a comparison with many measures to see whether any of them
shows an opposite behaviour or results are in line among the measure and against ours. If the
three-level model depicted by formula (5) served respectively for time, population of firms, and
business groups represented by the parents, once we aggregate over time we must drop the time
in weeks level and use a two-level model below for the remaining nested part:
yij = β + ς
(3)
j + ij . (7)
Several volatility measures are estimated at two-level random intercept regressions. Specif-
ically, given the process of log prices st
13, and its observed weekly opening prices opent, clos-
ing prices closet, high prices hight and low prices lowt, and defined the squared return as
r2t = (closet − closet−1)2, we test the two-level model against:
i. the standard deviation of the “old” variable Volatility ;
ii. the realized variance =
Σ52t=1r
2
t ; (8)
iii. the realized range14=
1
4ln2
Σ52t=1(hight − lowt)2; (9)
iv. the Garman-Klass estimator15 =
Σ52t=1
[
0.5(hight − lowt)2 − (2ln2− 1)(closet − closet−1)2
]
; (10)
v. the Rogers-Satchell estimator16 =
Σ52t=1[(hight − closet)(hight − closet−1) + (lowt − closet)(lowt − closet−1)]. (11)
5 Empirical findings
5.1 OLS regressions
Robust OLS regressions without and with financial covariates confirm the preliminary evidence
by showing a negative and significant premium to volatility from the affiliates in all regressions.
Both standard regression (table 3) and controlling for country and sector (table 6) show no rele-
vant impact on volatility except for the percentage fixed assets. The negative dependence found
suggests that firms with a higher percentage of investments are less volatile on financial markets.
When controlling on the total population of firms, the impact of the financing structure becomes
significant and positively correlated to volatility. This signals that the financing time-structure
of the firm matters when no business group is identified and firms are standing-alone. No role
seem to play labour productivity and financial pressure. The coefficient of the capital structure
12. Specifically, we refer to estimators tested by Martens and Van Dijk (2007).
13. The same observation of 8 applies here and in all the following formulas.
14. The realized range is based on Parkinson (1980) estimator = (hight−lowt)
2
4ln2
.
15. For further reference, see Garman and Klass (1980).
16. This estimator has the merit of being unbiased whatever the drift µ. For further reference, see Rogers and
Satchell (1991).
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Table 3: OLS regressions, excluding (P&A) and including single firms (All)
Dependent variable:
Volatility P&A All P&A All P&A All
Affiliate -0.155*** -0.189*** -0.085*** -0.125*** -0.077*** -0.110***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Labour productivity -0.021 -0.026* -0.012 -0.015
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Financial pressure 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Financial assets -0.267 -0.310
(0.578) (0.536)
Fixed assets -0.047*** -0.061***
(0.011) (0.009)
Equity / debt -0.005 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Long / short debt 0.084 0.058***
(0.054) (0.009)
Constant -0.023*** 0.011*** -0.088*** -0.047*** -0.119*** -0.080***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
R squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005
N 1’281’413 1’841’890 324’367 406’751 258’830 311’014
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses. Standardized variables, clustered by firm.
A negative and significant premium to volatility from the affiliates is shown in all regressions. No relevant impact
on volatility from the other regressors except for the percentage fixed assets.
equity/debt becomes slightly significant when controlling for country and sector fixed effects
(see table 6) and positively correlated to volatility. Firms therefore face some form of credit
market imperfections in violation of Modigliani and Miller (1958), and the ones with higher
equity are less volatile. In the same table 6 the positive coefficient of long term over short term
debt indicates that firms preferring short term borrowing are likely to have lower stock price
volatility, probably because of a higher default risk or difficulties in getting longer debt financing.
No relevant difference in all regression is found instead when inserting time fixed effects.
5.2 Random-effect regressions
The results of the three-level random intercept regression are shown by table 4. They confirm
the OLS results of coefficients sign and significance representing a double-check one of the other.
The random-intercept model however is able to show the relative intra-dependence within each
business group that the OLS cannot assess, and the low p-values of the Wald chi square statistics
indicate the goodness of fit of the overall three-level model. The novel evidence of the existence
of a financial management of a business group is well-defined according to the significance
of the standard deviation coefficients. The volatility among weeks shows not surprisingly the
highest variability, and the standard deviation between affiliates is generally higher than between
business groups. While controlling for financial variables, we find that labour productivity
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Table 4: Random intercept regressions
Dependent variable:
Volatility
Affiliate -0.087*** -0.035 -0.056*
Labour productivity -0.026** -0.013
Financial pressure 0.002 0.002
Financial assets 0.129
Fixed assets -0.042***
Equity / debt -0.006
Long / short debt 0.050
Constant 0.069*** -0.047*** -0.083***
SD (bw. groups) 0.558*** 0.451*** 0.465***
SD (bw. affiliates) 0.604*** 0.490*** 0.423***
SD (bw. weeks) 0.626*** 0.641*** 0.630***
N parent 26’720 6’760 5’344
N affiliate 29’282 7’236 5’676
N of weeks 52 52 52
N of observations 1’281’413 324’367 258’830
Log likelihood -1279623.4 -329578.7 -258105.1
Wald chi2(2) 24.9 11.3 21.4
Prob>chi2 0.0001 0.0104 0.0033
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001. Random–effect model confirms OLS results. Financial variables are found
to be weakly significant or not significant except again for fixed assets. The strong significance of the standard
deviation coefficients confirms a solid hierarchical structure across time.
becomes weakly significant despite the financial volatility. While making the full regression,
financial variables are found to be weakly significant or not significant except again for fixed
assets. The behaviour of Unilever PLC is representative of the behaviour of all business group
in the dataset; all the hypotheses of section 4.2 are verified. The strong significance of the
standard deviation coefficients confirms a solid snowflake hierarchical structure and provides
evidence for a well defined financial group-level actor in volatility transmission mechanisms
of financial markets, the reason of which we date back to the information on the group-level
fundamentals that is available to investors.
5.3 Group level sources of volatility
Financial volatility is possibly driven by hidden aspects of parent firms affecting the whole
business group. Indeed, after the three-level model we are left with an an unexplained source
of variability that already discounts the control put in the estimate. It is given by the intercept
ς
(3)
j common to every affiliate belonging to the same parent and it represents the volatility
component that is group-specific. We can assess with a prediction the group-level random
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intercept, obtaining a fixed parameter, slightly negative, for all the affiliates population. We can
exploit another advantage of the random-intercept model given by the possibility of inspecting a
source of variability lying outside of the tested model: the existence of this source of variability
indicates that belonging to a group or another makes a difference. A representation of the
random-intercept at group level Parent and its prediction is given in figure 5.
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the random-intercept at group level
Then we perform a post-estimation regression by testing, for each parent or group17, some
parent-related measures such as size, number of countries in which the group has affiliates, num-
ber of sector of product diversification and Tobin’s q. The OLS regression takes as dependent
variable the estimate of the group-level random intercept. Results in table 5 show that size, To-
bin’s q and numbers of countries in which the parent has affiliates show significant coefficients.
While the firm’s size and marketability impacts seem to lower volatility, the group variability is
increased with dispersion across many countries. Firm size is expected to be positively corre-
lated with the probability that firms attract external finance under the pecking order theory18;
therefore, it is reasonable that its share market will be more liquid and therefore the group
variability decreases with size. The market value of the firm over replacement costs has the
same effect of the firm’s size of decreasing the negative value of Parent. The impact of sector
diversification is not significant.
17. Parent firms balance sheet are consolidated in most of the cases. However, the confusion between parent
and group has not to be considered by an accounting perspective, that would be misleading because of lack of
harmonized accounting reporting, but rather the group must be intended as per our modelling definition.
18. According to De Haan and Hinloopen (2003).
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Table 5: Group-level sources of volatility
Dependent variable:
Parent
Size -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.141***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N countries 0.739*** 0.816***
(0.055) (0.055)
N sectors -0.017 -0.017
(0.017) (0.017)
Tobin’s q -0.178***
(0.017)
Constant 0.041*** 0.713*** 0.783***
(0.001) (0.048) (0.048)
R squared 0.109 0.109 0.115
N 265’928 265’928 254’800
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses. Standardized variables, robust. Size,
Tobin’s q and numbers of countries in which the parent has affiliates show significant coefficients; therefore they
are correlated to the group–level volatility.
5.4 The results of the robustness check
The econometric methodology outlined in section 4.3 is interesting per se; for how far the study
is conceived, it represents also a robustness check. We provide the results of estimation through
alternative measures of volatility starting from the closest ones to our volatility measure: the
standard deviation of Volatility and the realized range. Left-hand panel of table 7 shows the
behaviour of the OLS results obtained by collapsing the volatility measure over the weeks with
the standard deviation operator. We can observe that the magnitude orders between the dummy
affiliate effect over the two datasets without and with single firms is the same as in the three-level
model: the effect is higher on the largest dataset. Vice versa the effect is higher on the smallest
dataset for the realized range (right-hand panel of table 7) and for the other measures of section
4.3 (see the Appendix, table 10). Table 9 shows comparison values for the regression results on
the dataset without single firms. All the results reveal a coefficient of the dummy affiliate still
negative and strongly significant. Tables 8 and 11 show the results of the two-level model. We
see that the behaviour of the alternative measures of volatility is completely in line with the
results of section 5.2 and the standard deviations are statistically strongly significant for all the
measures.
6 Concluding remarks
We ask whether Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and, more in general, business conglomerates
have an influence on the volatility of financial markets stock prices. While the answer can
be intuitively thought as positive, it is necessary to assess what does a financial management
of a business group means in case it is well defined. To answer the research question, we
build a world-wide dataset of weekly stock prices of quoted firms linked by a parent-affiliate
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relationship. We develop a methodology to assess whether listed firms show a group behaviour
and if there is any relevant difference between parent and affiliates in terms of volatility, and
whether the supposed group structure does not decompose through the weeks. If the parent-
affiliate relationship has an influence over share prices volatility it can consequently act as a
channel for the propagation of financial shocks or imbalances on the financial markets. We
find that the parent-affiliate relationship is significantly correlated to financial markets volatility
and a hierarchical two-layer model exists on top of the retrieved financial data. The empirical
investigation confirms the hypotheses and does not depend on the empirical model chosen.
Even adding corporate regressors commonly used to investigate firms structure, productivity
and constraints, the business group structure keeps significant over the weeks. We can conclude
that corporate control has an impact on financial volatility. The findings provide a robust
definition of business group acting on financial markets and open the pave for the investigation
of new dynamics through the undiscovered channel of corporate control. The methodology built
can be easily generalized to vertically multi-layered hierarchical structures; in particular the
same methodology could be used to investigate multi-layered business groups in which affiliates
are parent firms themselves.
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Appendix A.
Additional information on the data
The initial dataset consists of a 154 countries dataset, with a total of 63′737 firms, of which
30′550 parent, 3′664 affiliate, 29′523 single companies. Europe, Asia, India, Korea and South
America are the regions where we find more stand-alone companies than parent firms; in all the
other regions world-wide, we register more companies with at least one affiliate than single firms.
The financial variables described in section 3 are computed at firm level as follows.
• Size is proxied by the year sales;
• Financial assets is the share of financial assets (other fixed assets plus cash equivalent)
over total assets excluding other fixed assets and cash equivalent;
• Fixed assets is the percentage of fixed assets over total assets;
• Equity / debt is the ratio between shareholders’ funds and long term debt;
• Long / short debt is the ratio between non-current and current liabilities;
• Labour productivity is the value added per employee;
• Financial pressure is given by interest payments over the profit before tax plus deprecia-
tion;
• Tobin’s q is computed as the firm market valuation over the accountable value of fixed
assets; precisely, it is computed as 1 plus the marginal market value of the firm minus its
book value.
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Figure 6: Volatility densities by region
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Figure 7: Volatility densities by sector
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Appendix B.
Additional tables
Table 6: Regression with country-sector control, excluding (P&A) and including
single firms (All)
Dependent variable:
Volatility P&A All P&A All P&A All
Affiliate -0.126*** -0.148*** -0.105*** -0.135*** -0.100*** -0.123***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Labour productivity -0.015 -0.019* -0.008 -0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Financial pressure -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Financial activity -0.207 -0.393
(0.528) (0.488)
Fixed assets -0.050*** -0.055***
(0.011) (0.010)
Equity / debt -0.009* -0.008*
(0.004) (0.004)
Long / short debt 0.083* 0.051***
(0.040) (0.009)
Constant -0.025*** 0.019*** -0.086*** -0.047*** -0.116*** -0.083***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
R squared 0.211 0.230 0.164 0.154 0.163 0.156
N 1’274’315 1’809’773 323’707 405’441 258’425 310’214
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parenthesis. Standardized variables, clustered by firm.
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Table 7: Robustness check results, standard deviation of volatility and realized
range
Dependent variable: SD(Volatility) Realized range
P&A All P&A All
Affiliate -0.090*** -0.136*** -0.249*** -0.088***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant -0.038*** 0.008 0.166*** 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
R squared 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.001
N 29’696 44’446 34’214 63’737
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses.
Table 8: Two-level robustness check results for standard deviation of volatility and
realized range
Dependent variable: SD(Volatility) Realized range
Affiliate -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.250*** -0.116*** -0.081***
Labour productivity -0.176* -0.006 -0.015 -0.004
Financial pressure 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
Financial assets 0.064 0.013
Fixed assets -0.022* -0.030**
Equity / debt 0.001 0.004
Long / short debt 0.058 0.128*
Constant -0.038*** -0.165*** -0.210*** 0.166*** 0.079*** 0.047**
SD (bw. groups) 0.611*** 0.398*** 0.464*** 0.379*** 0.438*** 0.517***
SD (bw. affiliates) 0.672*** 0.526*** 0.273*** 0.870*** 0.587*** 0.363***
N parent 27’084 6’760 5’340 30’602 7’486 5’857
N affiliate 29’696 7’242 5’672 34’214 8’063 6’237
Log likelihood -38883.2 -7222.5 -4387.9 -46672.2 -8878.8 -5860.5
Wald chi2(2) 0.2 4.6 7.7 186.2 20.9 23.3
Prob>chi2 0.6344 0.2025 0.3595 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001.
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Table 9: Robustness check results, other measures of volatility
Dependent variable: Realized variance Garman-Klass Rogers-Satchell
Affiliate -0.226*** -0.238*** -0.193***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.130***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
R squared 0.005 0.006 0.004
N 34’214 33’281 33’858
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses.
Table 10: Robustness check results including stand-alone firms, other measures of
volatility
Dependent variable: Realized variance Garman-Klass Rogers-Satchell
Affiliate -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.067***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R squared 0.001 0.001 0.001
N 63’737 61’704 62’964
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parenthesis.
Table 11: Two-level robustness check results, other measures of volatility
Dependent variable: Realized variance Garman-Klass Rogers-Satchell
Affiliate -0.153*** -0.243*** -0.211***
Constant 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.130***
SD (bw. groups) 0.607*** 0.326*** 0.316***
SD (bw. affiliates) 0.755*** 0.889*** 0.891***
N parent 30’602 29’860 30’320
N affiliate 34’214 33’281 33’858
Log likelihood -47012.2 -43536.5 -46103.1
Wald chi2(2) 70.7 174.7 135.8
Prob>chi2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001.
22
References
Aggarwal, Raj, and NyoNyo Aung Kyaw. 2010. “Capital structure, dividend policy, and multi-
nationality: Theory versus empirical evidence.” International Review of Financial Analysis
19 (2): 140–150.
Albuquerque, Rui, Tarun Ramadorai, and Sumudu W Watugala. 2015. “Trade credit and cross-
country predictable firm returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 115 (3): 592–613.
Alizadeh, Sassan, Michael W Brandt, and Francis X Diebold. 2002. “Range-based estimation of
stochastic volatility models.” The Journal of Finance 57 (3): 1047–1091.
Almeida, Heitor, Sang Yong Park, Marti G Subrahmanyam, and Daniel Wolfenzon. 2011. “The
structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols.” Journal of
Financial Economics 99 (2): 447–475.
Altomonte, Carlo, Filippo Di Mauro, Gianmarco Ireo Paolo Ottaviano, Armando Rungi, and
Vincent Vicard. 2011. “Global value chains during the great trade collapse: a bullwhip
effect?”
Altomonte, Carlo, and Armando Rungi. 2013. “Business groups as hierarchies of firms: deter-
minants of vertical integration and performance.”
Antras, Pol, Mihir A Desai, and C Fritz Foley. 2009. “Multinational firms, FDI flows, and
imperfect capital markets.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (3): 1171–1219.
Atalay, Enghin, Ali Hortac¸su, and Chad Syverson. 2014. “Vertical integration and input flows.”
The American Economic Review 104 (4): 1120–1148.
Baker, Malcolm, Jeremy C Stein, and Jeffrey Wurgler. 2003. “When does the market matter?
Stock prices and the investment of equity-dependent firms.” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118 (3): 969–1005.
Bandi, Federico M, and Jeffrey R Russell. 2006. “Separating microstructure noise from volatil-
ity.” Journal of Financial Economics 79 (3): 655–692.
Bandi, Federico M, and Jeffrey R Russell. 2008. “Microstructure noise, realized variance, and
optimal sampling.” The Review of Economic Studies 75 (2): 339–369.
Bansal, Ravi, Dana Kiku, Ivan Shaliastovich, and Amir Yaron. 2014. “Volatility, the macroe-
conomy, and asset prices.” The Journal of Finance 69 (6): 2471–2511.
Beckers, Stan. 1983. “Variances of security price returns based on high, low, and closing prices.”
Journal of Business: 97–112.
Bergh, Donald D, and Michael W Lawless. 1998. “Portfolio restructuring and limits to hierar-
chical governance: The effects of environmental uncertainty and diversification strategy.”
Organization Science 9 (1): 87–102.
Bolton, Patrick, Neng Wang, and Jinqiang Yang. 2013. Liquidity hoarding and investment under
uncertainty. Technical report. Working papers.
Cai, Weixing, Cheng Colin Zeng, Edward Lee, and Neslihan Ozkan. 2016. “Do business groups
affect corporate cash holdings? Evidence from a transition economy.” China Journal of
Accounting Research 9 (1): 1–24.
Chang, Sea Jin. 2003. “Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated
companies in Korea.” Academy of Management Journal 46 (2): 238–253.
23
Chen, Kevin CW, Zhihong Chen, and KC John Wei. 2011. “Agency costs of free cash flow and
the effect of shareholder rights on the implied cost of equity capital.” Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 46 (01): 171–207.
Cho, Myeong-Hyeon. 1998. “Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: an em-
pirical analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics 47 (1): 103–121.
Choi, Jaewon, and Matthew Richardson. 2016. “The volatility of a firm’s assets and the leverage
effect.” Journal of Financial Economics 121 (2): 254–277.
Choi, Jongmoo Jay, and Cao Jiang. 2009. “Does multinationality matter? Implications of op-
erational hedging for the exchange risk exposure.” Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (11):
1973–1982.
Christensen, Kim, and Mark Podolskij. 2007. “Realized range-based estimation of integrated
variance.” Journal of Econometrics 141 (2): 323–349.
Christopher, Martin, and Matthias Holweg. 2017. “Supply Chain 2.0 revisited: a framework for
managing volatility-induced risk in the supply chain.” International Journal of Physical
Distribution & Logistics Management 47 (1).
Cohen, Lauren, and Dong Lou. 2012. “Complicated firms.” Journal of financial economics 104
(2): 383–400.
Cooley, Thomas F, and Vincenzo Quadrini. 2001. “Financial markets and firm dynamics.” Amer-
ican economic review: 1286–1310.
Corrado, Charles, and Cameron Truong. 2007. “forecasting stock index volatility: comparing
implied Volatility and the intraday high–low price range.” Journal of Financial Research
30 (2): 201–215.
Cravino, Javier, and Andrei A Levchenko. 2016. “Multinational firms and international business
cycle transmission.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics: qjw043.
Cummins, J David, and Mary A Weiss. 2016. “Equity Capital, Internal Capital Markets, and
Optimal Capital Structure in the US Property-Casualty Insurance Industry.” Annual Re-
view of Financial Economics 8:121–153.
De Haan, Leo, and Jeroen Hinloopen. 2003. “Preference hierarchies for internal finance, bank
loans, bond, and share issues: evidence for Dutch firms.” Journal of Empirical Finance 10
(5): 661–681.
Desai, Mihir A, and C Fritz Foley. 2006. “The comovement of returns and investment within the
multinational firm.” In NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2004, 197–240.
The MIT Press.
Desai, Mihir A, C Fritz Foley, and Kristin J Forbes. 2008. “Financial constraints and growth:
Multinational and local firm responses to currency depreciations.” Review of Financial
Studies 21 (6): 2857–2888.
Desai, Mihir A, C Fritz Foley, and James R Hines. 2004. “A multinational perspective on capital
structure choice and internal capital markets.” The Journal of Finance 59 (6): 2451–2487.
Desai, Mihir A, C Fritz Foley, and James R Hines. 2008. “Capital structure with risky foreign
investment.” Journal of Financial Economics 88 (3): 534–553.
Desai, Mihir A, C Fritz Foley, and James R Hines. 2009. “Domestic effects of the foreign activities
of US multinationals.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (1): 181–203.
24
Desai, Mihir C, C Fritz Foley, and James R Hines Jr. 2005. Foreign direct investment and the
domestic capital stock. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Eden, Maya. 2017. “Misallocation and the Distribution of Global Volatility.” American Eco-
nomic Review.
Eisfeldt, Andrea L, and Dimitris Papanikolaou. 2014. “The value and ownership of intangible
capital.” The American Economic Review 104 (5): 189–194.
Eiteman, David K, Arthur I Stonehill, and Michael H Moffett. 2004. Multinational Business
Finance: David K. Eiteman, Arthur I. Stonehill, Michael H. Moffett. Pearson Education
India.
Foley, C Fritz, and Kalina Manova. 2015. “International trade, multinational activity, and cor-
porate finance.” economics 7 (1): 119–146.
Fratzscher, Marcel, and Jean Imbs. 2009. “Risk sharing, finance, and institutions in international
portfolios.” Journal of Financial Economics 94 (3): 428–447.
Garicano, Luis. 2000. “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production.” Journal
of political economy 108 (5): 874–904.
Garicano, Luis, and Claudia Steinwender. 2016. “Survive another day: Using changes in the
composition of investments to measure the cost of credit constraints.” Review of Economics
and Statistics 98 (5): 913–924.
Gaˆrleanu, Nicolae, Stavros Panageas, and Jianfeng Yu. 2015. “Financial entanglement: A the-
ory of incomplete integration, leverage, crashes, and contagion.” The American Economic
Review 105 (7): 1979–2010.
Garman, Mark B, and Michael J Klass. 1980. “On the estimation of security price volatilities
from historical data.” Journal of business: 67–78.
Gaspar, Jose-Miguel, and Massimo Massa. 2007. “Local ownership as private information: Evi-
dence on the monitoring-liquidity trade-off.” Journal of Financial Economics 83 (3): 751–
792.
Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2006. Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical
models. Cambridge university press.
Giovanni, Julian di, and Andrei A Levchenko. 2009. “Trade openness and volatility.” The Review
of Economics and Statistics 91 (3): 558–585.
Gomes, Joao F. 2001. “Financing investment.” American Economic Review: 1263–1285.
Guerrieri, Veronica, and Pe´ter Kondor. 2012. “Fund managers, career concerns, and asset price
volatility.” The American Economic Review 102 (5): 1986–2017.
Gul, Ferdinand A, Jeong-Bon Kim, and Annie A Qiu. 2010. “Ownership concentration, foreign
shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China.” Journal
of Financial Economics 95 (3): 425–442.
Hall, Robert E. 1999. The stock market and capital accumulation. Technical report. National
bureau of economic research.
Harford, Jarrad, Cong Wang, and Kuo Zhang. 2016. “Foreign Cash: Taxes, Internal Capital
Markets, and Agency Problems.”
25
Al-Haschimi, Alexander, Stephane Dees, Filippo di Mauro, and Martina Jancokova. 2014. “Link-
ing distress of financial institutions to macrofinancial shocks.”
Itoˆ, Kiyosi. 1974. Diffusion processes. Wiley Online Library.
Jacob, Joshy, et al. 2008. “Estimation and forecasting of stock volatility with range-based esti-
mators.” Journal of Futures Markets 28 (6): 561–581.
Jensen, Michael C. 1986. “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.” The
American economic review 76 (2): 323–329.
Jensen, Michael C, and William H Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure.” Journal of financial economics 3 (4): 305–360.
Khanna, Tarun, and Yishay Yafeh. 2005. “Business groups and risk sharing around the world.”
The Journal of Business 78 (1): 301–340.
Kolasinski, Adam C. 2009. “Subsidiary debt, capital structure and internal capital markets.”
Journal of financial economics 94 (2): 327–343.
Korajczyk, Robert A, and Amnon Levy. 2003. “Capital structure choice: macroeconomic con-
ditions and financial constraints.” Journal of financial economics 68 (1): 75–109.
Kose, M Ayhan. 2002. “Explaining business cycles in small open economies: How much do world
prices matter?” Journal of International Economics 56 (2): 299–327.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 2000. “In-
vestor protection and corporate governance.” Journal of financial economics 58 (1): 3–27.
Mahmood, Ishtiaq P, Hongjin Zhu, and Akbar Zaheer. 2016. “Centralization of intragroup equity
ties and performance of business group affiliates.” Strategic Management Journal.
Martens, Martin, and Dick Van Dijk. 2007. “Measuring volatility with the realized range.”
Journal of Econometrics 138 (1): 181–207.
McLean, R David. 2011. “Share issuance and cash savings.” Journal of Financial Economics 99
(3): 693–715.
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H Miller. 1958. “The cost of capital, corporation finance and
the theory of investment.” The American economic review: 261–297.
Moll, Benjamin. 2014. “Productivity losses from financial frictions: can self-financing undo cap-
ital misallocation?” The American Economic Review 104 (10): 3186–3221.
Myers, Stewart C, and Nicholas S Majluf. 1984. “Corporate financing and investment decisions
when firms have information that investors do not have.” Journal of financial economics 13
(2): 187–221.
Nickell, Stephen, and Daphne Nicolitsas. 1999. “How does financial pressure affect firms?” Eu-
ropean Economic Review 43 (8): 1435–1456.
Parkinson, Michael. 1980. “The extreme value method for estimating the variance of the rate of
return.” Journal of Business: 61–65.
Patton, Andrew J. 2011. “Volatility forecast comparison using imperfect volatility proxies.”
Journal of Econometrics 160 (1): 246–256.
Poelhekke, Steven. 2016. “Financial globalization and foreign direct investment.”
26
Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 2002. “Investor
protection and corporate valuation.” The journal of finance 57 (3): 1147–1170.
Ramondo, Natalia, and Veronica Rappoport. 2010. “The role of multinational production in a
risky environment.” Journal of International Economics 81 (2): 240–252.
Ramondo, Natalia, Veronica Rappoport, and Kim J Ruhl. 2016. “Intrafirm trade and verti-
cal fragmentation in US multinational corporations.” Journal of International Economics
98:51–59.
Rogers, L Christopher G, and Stephen E Satchell. 1991. “Estimating variance from high, low
and closing prices.” The Annals of Applied Probability: 504–512.
Shyam-Sunder, Lakshmi, and Stewart C Myers. 1999. “Testing static tradeoff against pecking
order models of capital structure.” Journal of financial economics 51 (2): 219–244.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2010. Risk and global economic architecture: Why full financial integration
may be undesirable. Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sturgess, Jason. 2016. “Multinational Firms, Internal Capital Markets, and the Value of Global
Diversification.” Quarterly Journal of Finance 6 (02): 1650004.
Sun, Tao. 2010. “Identifying Vulnerabilities in Systemically Important Financial Institutions
in a Macro-Financial Linkages Framework.” The Journal of Economic Asymmetries 7 (2):
77–103.
Takahashi, Makoto, Yasuhiro Omori, and Toshiaki Watanabe. 2009. “Estimating stochastic
volatility models using daily returns and realized volatility simultaneously.” Computational
Statistics & Data Analysis 53 (6): 2404–2426.
Yang, Dennis, and Qiang Zhang. 2000. “Drift-independent volatility estimation based on high,
low, open, and close prices.” The Journal of Business 73 (3): 477–492.
27
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 © IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca 
Piazza San ponziano 6, 55100 Lucca, Italy.  
www.imtlucca.it 
